Reform the International Monetary System改革国际货币系统

Zhou Xiaochuan 周小川

The outbreak of the current crisis and its spillover in the world have confronted us with a long-existing but still unanswered question,i.e., what kind of international reserve currency do we need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world economic growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing the IMF? There were various institutional arrangements in an attempt to find a solution, including the Silver Standard, the Gold Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard and the Bretton Woods system. The above question, however, as the ongoing financial crisis demonstrates, is far from being solved, and has become even more severe due to the inherent weaknesses of the current international monetary system.

目前一轮席卷全世界的危机让我们必须正视一个长期存在但迟迟没有解答的问题，那就是，为了确保全球金融稳定和促进世界经济发展，除了成立国际货币基金组织（IMF）之外，我们究竟需要一种怎样的国际储备货币？有很多制度试图对此提供解决方案，包括银本位，金本位，金汇兑本位以及布雷顿森林体系在内。但是正如眼下的金融危机所表现出来的，这个问题远远称不上被解决——由于当前的国际货币系统存在内生弱点，甚至有愈演愈烈的趋势。

Theoretically, an international reserve currency should first be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.

理论上来说，作为国际储备货币，首先要与一种稳定的基准挂钩，依照一套清楚明了的规范发行，如此才能确保有序供给；其次，为了能够顺应变化的需求做出及时的调整，供给要足够灵活；第三，做出的调整与任何国家的经济状况和主权利益必须是不相联系的。在目前的系统中，接受基于信用发行的国家货币作为主要的国际储备货币这种情况，从历史上来看，是十分罕见的。而这场危机再次呼唤对已存的国际货币系统进行有创意的改革，从而催生一种有稳定价值，基于规范发行，同时可管理供给的国际货币，从而达到保障全球经济和金融稳定的目标。

I. The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire world reflect the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international monetary system.

一．该场危机的爆发以及它对整个世界的席卷反映了目前国际货币系统的内生脆弱性以及系统风险。

Issuing countries of reserve currencies are constantly confronted with the dilemma between achieving their domestic monetary policy goals and meeting other countries’ demand for reserve currencies. On the one hand, the monetary authorities cannot simply focus on domestic goals without carrying out their international responsibilities；on the other hand, they cannot pursue different domestic and international objectives at the same time. They may either fail to adequately meet the demand of a growing global economy for liquidity as they try to ease inflation pressures at home, or create excess liquidity in the global markets by overly stimulating domestic demand. The Triffin Dilemma, i.e., the issuing countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain the value of the reserve currencies while providing liquidity to the world, still exists.

储备货币的发行国经常处于两难之中：达成本国货币政策目标或是满足其他国家对储备货币的需求。一方面，货币当局不能只关注国内目标而不去承担他们的国际责任；另一方面，他们又不能同时追逐不同的国内和国际目标：不是为了平抑国内的通货膨胀压力而不能充分满足增长的全球经济对流动性的要求，就是由于过分刺激国内需求而在全球市场上创造的多余流动性。储备货币的发行国家不能在提供流动性的同时维持该种货币的价值，即特里芬难题，仍然存在。

When a national currency is used in pricing primary commodities, trade settlements and is adopted as a reserve currency globally, efforts of the monetary authority issuing such a currency to address its economic imbalances by adjusting exchange rate would be made in vain, as its currency serves as a benchmark for many other currencies. While benefiting from a widely accepted reserve currency, the globalization also suffers from the flaws of such a system. The frequency and increasing intensity of financial crises following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system suggests the costs of such a system to the world may have exceeded its benefits. The price is becoming increasingly higher, not only for the users, but also for the issuers of the reserve currencies. Although crisis may not necessarily be an intended result of the issuing authorities, it is an inevitable outcome of the institutional flaws.

如果一国货币用来标价初级大宗商品，贸易结算，并且成为储备货币，那么发行该种货币的当局试图通过改变汇率从而调整经济失衡的努力就是徒劳的——因为该种货币已经成为很多其他货币的基准。全球化既受惠于一种广为接受的储备货币的存在，但同时也受难于该系统的缺陷。布雷顿森林体系崩溃后愈发频繁，也愈发严重的金融危机暗示着维持这样一个系统的成本或许已经超过了它给世界带来的好处。不仅对于使用者来说，代价已经越来越高了，就是对于储备货币的发行者来说，亦是如此。尽管危机并不一定是发行当局故意为之，但它是该种制度缺陷所产生的不可避免的后果。